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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

JAMES PRIEUR,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Appeal No. 20180704-CA
vs.
THE ENSIGN GROUP INC.,
Defendant and Appellee.
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Utah's Appellate Courts have long held that stipulated-to agreements are to be
ratified by the Court. The Utah Supreme Court's held that, unless there are issues for
judicial determination in the stipulation, "ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations
between parties." First of Denver Mortg. Inv'rs v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d

5
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521, 527 (Utah 1979). 1
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has noted that '[t]here is an institutional
hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the
advice of counsel,' Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
Pursuant to Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 364 (Utah 1995), the
standard or review in this matter is that the factual allegations are accepted as true,
and all reasonable inferences are drawn from them in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff. The propriety of the Court's dismissal of Appellant's case, despite the
stipulated agreement between the parties, is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court. This issue was
preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial; Plaintiffs Motion for
Relief from the court's Minute Order as to the Parties January 2, 2017 Stipulation;
Motion to Reopen Discovery; and Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Orders on
Motions in Limine (R 341-359; 410-425; 426-441; 442-472)

II I
The term 'judicial determination" is a nebulous one. Although Plaintiffs were
unable to find a more definite description of what items are ripe for judicial
determination, a case involving a stipulation in a contract case noting time extensions
noted that judicial determination is unnecessary as "Such an exception is not
applicable in this case." Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2009 UT App 314,221 P.3d 884, 886, Fn.
1.
1

6
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Utah County, granting Defendant's Motion for ·summary
Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a) U.R.C.P. This is an action pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. 78B-3-403 seeking compensation for Medical Malpractice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
References herein are to the Record of this Case, No. 130400555 (R.).
This medical malpractice case arose out of the care and treatment received by
Appellant's decedent, Sharon Horen ("Ms. Horen"), at Central Utah Clinic and
Defendant Orem Rehabilitation and Skilled Nursing ("Orem Rehab"). On October
15, 2010, Ms. Horen was seen by John Walker, a nephrology APRN, at Central Utah
Clinic for examination following an observed change in Ms. Horen's condition at
Orem Rehab. During this visit, Mr. Walker wrote an order for STAT labs to be
performed on Ms. Horen and Ms. Horen was returned to Orem Rehab with the order.
Ms. Horen's blood was drawn and the STAT lab results were faxed to Orem Rehab at
approximately 7: 14 p.m. on that same day. The STAT lab results indicated that Ms.
Horen had a serum potassium level of 8.6-a "high panic" value.
The staff at Orem Rehab failed to notice, report, or otherwise act on the STAT
7
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labs. Mr. Walker likewise failed to follow up on his order. As a result, none of Ms.
Horen's health care providers were made aware of her serum potassium level of 8.6.
Just after midnight on October 16, 2010, Ms. Horen was found minimally responsive
by Orem Rehab staff. Following transport to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center,
and pursuant to Ms. Horen's advanced directive, no therapeutic treatments were
administered and Ms. Horen expired on October 16, 2010.
During Discovery in the underlying matter, the parties, jointly having failed to
complete discovery, ~d expressing a desire to settle the matter formed stipulations
to extend discovery. On March 26, 2015, the parties stipulated to extend discovery.
See Third Stipulated Statement to Extend Fact Discovery. (R. 69-71). In that
Stipulation, the parties anticipated concluding fact discovery on June 30, 2015. See

The parties were unable to complete fact discovery within the anticipated June
30, 2015 deadline, including Appellee's request to conduct Appellant James Prieur's
deposition on September 25, 2015. The parties continued attempting to resolve this
matter without incurring additional costs and using Court resources. In September of
2015, Defendants agreed that they breached the standard of care, prepared a
Stipulation to that effect. (R.87-90)
Shortly thereafter, Appellee expressed interest in attempting to mediate this
case prior to incurring expert discovery costs. (R. 410-425). The parties scheduled a
8
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mediation to take place on July 11, 2016, which was postponed at the request of
defense counsel for personal reasons. See Id.
The parties were able to reschedule the mediation to take place on August 25,
2016, with Lew Quigley as the mediator. However, the parties were unable to reach
an agreement on the date of the mediation, and Mr. Quigley continued
communicating with both parties in an attempt to resolve the matter without further
litigation.
Toward the end of 2016, Mr. Quigley informed Appellant's previous counsel,
Brandon Kidman, that settlement on this case would be unlikely. See Id. Mr. Kidman
then reached out to Defendants' counsel in order to come up with a new discovery
plan now that a resolution to the case without proceeding with litigation was
unlikely. See id.
The parties were able to finalize a new Stipulation and submitted a proposed
case management order to the Court that would assist in allowing the case to move
forward. (R. 120-122). Both parties anticipated that expert discovery would not begin
until early 2017. Id. The parties anticipated that Plaintiffs would disclose their
experts on February 28, 2017. Id. On January 30, 2017, the Court declined to sign the
proposed order, entering a note that discovery had closed. (R. 123-125)
On February 21, 2017, before the stipulated-to February 28, 2017 deadline, the
Court entered a Notice of Final Pre-trial Conference, indicating that fact discovery
9
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had ended on June 30, 2015 and all discovery and dispositive motions were due by
October 30, 2015. The Court ruled on three Motions in Limine and a Motion for
Summary Judgment brought by Appellees after the Court's January 30, 2017 order
without oral argument. (R. 235-250).

SUMMARY OF ARGU:IVIENTS
Appellant's Petition respectfully requests that the Court grant relief from the
District Court's order granting Summary Judgment. The Order is based wholly on
the fact that Appellant had failed to present expert testimony in this matter.
However, Appellant's "failure" to submit the requested evidence was due to the
fact that the parties had repeatedly agreed to settle the matter and to extend the
applicable discovery period. This agreement was memorialized in the fully
executed agreement between the parties to extend discovery entered into on
January 24, 2017. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that courts are typically
bound by a parties' stipulation, unless that stipulation requires a judicial
determination. The parties' agreement to extend the time for discovery in this
matter should have been ratified by the Court and it was error for the Court to
refuse to recognize the agreement between the parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
10
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THE COURT'S DECISION TO REFUSE TO RATIFY THE PARTIES
STIPULATED-TO AGREEMENT TO EXTEND DISCOVERY WAS
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
In this case, the District Court failed to allow Appellant to submit their expert
disclosures within the timeframe agreed upon by the parties. The parties initially
entered into a Stipulation and the Court signed a Case Management Order
extending fact discovery through June 30, 2015. See Third Stipulated Statement to
Extend Fact Discovery, Ct. Docket. However, due to scheduling conflicts and
Defendants' request to continue fact discovery efforts, the parties were unable to
complete discovery within the June 30, 2015 deadline.
Not only had the parties been pursuing settlement opportunities, litigation
was actively being prepared for as well, as deposition were scheduled by both
parties. Following these depositions, the parties agreed to narrow the triable issues
in this case by entering into a stipulation in which Appellee agreed to admit
breaching the standard of care. In the process of preparing that Stipulation, defense
counsel indicated to Appellant that they were not ready to proceed into expert
discovery, and that they desired to attempt mediation before incurring expert
discovery costs. The mediation ultimately failed and mediation efforts ended in
December 2016.
Fallowing the parties' failure to resolve this case through the mediator,
11
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Plaintiffs' previous counsel, Brandon Kidman, attempted to contact defense
counsel in order to move forward with expert discovery. Mr. Kidman sent a
follow-up email to defense counsel on January 12, 2017, again attempting to set a
timeline for expert discovery now that mediation failed. Defense counsel
responded on that day, and agreed to review Plaintiffs' proposal for completing
expert discovery.
In that email, defense counsel expressly stated that in the stipulation "we
need to make sure it indicates that the fact discovery deadline has passed and that
we are now moving into expert discovery." On January 24, 2017, the parties agreed
that February 28, 2017 would be a reasonable deadline for the parties' burden of
proof expert disclosures.
Before the February 28, 2017 deadline, and despite the good faith efforts by
the parties to resolve the case in the most amicable and cost-effective way, the
Court declined the parties' stipulated request to move into expert discovery. On
January 30, 2017, the Court declined to sign the Stipulated proposed Order, with a
minute entry that stated, "the discovery period has closed. The parties do not show
good cause for the delays in this case. This case should either be dismissed, or
proceed to trial without further delay." See minute entry, Ct. Docket. Then on
February 21, 2017, the Court entered a Notice of Final Pretrial Conference,
12
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reiterating its denial of the parties' stipulated request. See Ct.
Docket.
This refusal to honor the stipulated-to agreement between the parties runs
contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's holding that, unless there are issues for
judicial determination in the stipulation, "ordinarily, courts are bound by
stipulations between parties." First of Denver Mortg. Inv'rs v. C. N. Zundel &
Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979).
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has noted that '[t]here is an institutional
hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the
advice of counsel,' Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a Court may only set aside a
stipulation in certain circumstances-none of which are present in the instant case.
The stipulation in this case was agreed upon by parties' counsel, and was not
"inadvertent." But most importantly, there was no request by either party to rescind
the stipulation.
[A] court has the discretion to set aside a stipulation under certain conditions.

First, the party seeking relief from the stipulation must request it by motion
from the trial court. Second, the motion to repudiate the stipulation must be
timely

filed.

Third,

it

must

show

that

the

stipulation

was "entered

13
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into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." Inadvertence cannot be the basis for
repudiation when the mistake was " 'due to failure to exercise due diligence, [or if
it could] have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.' We have also noted
that "[i]t is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the court
was entered into inadvertently." Fourth, the lower court must state its basis for
relieving

the

parties

of

the

stipulation.

("In

the

absence

of

any articulated 'justifiable cause,' we must reverse the withdrawal of the
stipulation."
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11,

~

21, 20 P.3d 287, 293 (Internal Citations Omitted) (Emphasis Added).
Neither party asked for the stipulation to be repudiated. There was certainly
no motion filed to repudiate the stipulation. And finally, the stipulation was entered
into with the assistance of counsel. Likewise, the parties' stipulation in this matter
was not dependent upon a judicial determination in any form. The parties had been
diligent in pursuing settlement in this matter and had communicated with each
other on the need for discovery-including to commence expert discovery.
Furthermore, there was no contention between the parties that discovery had
been completed. The Court's decision to terminate discovery in the matter was
unwarranted as the parties were of one accord as to the need for further discovery.
14
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Based upon this unanimity of purpose of the parties and the lack of any need for
judicial determination by the Court, it should have allowed the parties' stipulatedto agreement to stand.
POINT II
THE COURT'S SUMMARY WDGMENT ORDER SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
AS IT WAS BASED UPON THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REFUSAL
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY

As a result of the Court's refusal to allow the parties to move into expert discovery,
as anticipated and agreed upon by the parties, Appellee filed a Summary Judgment
Motion, arguing that the case should be dismissed since Plaintiffs had not disclosed
any experts. The Court granted Appellee's Motion, and dismissed Appellant's
claims.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals should grant Petitioner's petition and
reverse the District Court's Summary Judgment Order. This will allow the parties to
conduct expert discovery, as anticipated and stipulated by the respective parties, and
allow the case to proceed to a fair trial for all the parties involved.
Furthermore, in the Court's Notice of Final Pre-trial Conference, the Court
scheduled a hearing on any pre- trial motions for April 17, 2017. Appellee filed
several motions, including Motions in Limine as well as a Summary Judgment
Motion. Appellant opposed those motions, and Appellee filed replies to those
15
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motions. Appellant was planning on arguing against those motions on April 17,
201 7, as scheduled by the Court.
However, the Court ruled on the motions, including the Summary Judgment
Motion, prior to the scheduled oral arguments, and ordered the case "dismissed" on
April 12, 2017. By canceling the oral arguments and dismissing this case prior to the
scheduled oral arguments, the Court prevented Appellant from being able to fully
argue and present their opposition to Appellee's motions, including its Summary
Judgment Motion.
Without oral argument, Appellant was unable to have a fair opportunity to
fully defend against Appellee's motions, including their Summary Judgment Motion.
The Court's actions in this matter were arbitrary, and, in the case of the Court's
refusal to ratify the stipulated-to agreement regarding extending discovery, violated
the Appellate Court's findings on the issue.
Any failure of Appellant to disclose experts was the result of Appellant's
attempts to cooperate with Appellee and reliance on Appellee's representations
regarding expert discovery. The Court's denial of the stipulated expert discovery
deadline, as well as Defendants' request for summary judgment based on the lack of
expert disclosures, prevented Appellant from fully litigating his case before the bar.
Petitioner was denied this opportunity, despite working with Appellee throughout the
litigation process. As such, Appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing without a
16
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preconceived dete1mination.
CONCLUSION
This case is before this Court on review of the order of Summary Judgment
granted against Appellant by the Court under Rule 56(a). Petitioner and Appellee
had a fully executed stipulation which the Cami chose not to ratify. There is no
compelling reason to refuse ratification of the parties' stipulation. As such, the
Court's order of summary judgment should be reversed, and the matter should be
remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2019.
BIGHORN LAW.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of December, 2018, Appellant served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT BRIEF upon the parties listed
below via email.
Stephen T. Hester
Kimberley L. Hansen
CORNE KINGHORN
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 801-363-4300

shester@cohnekinghom.com
khansen@cohnekinehom.com
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CERTIFICATE OF COIVIPLIANCE
I, Allen M.
Young,
certify that this Brief complies with URAP
24(a)(l 1)(A) paragraph (g), gove1ning the number of pages or words in the instant
brief.
I
also
certify
that
this
Brief
complies
(a)(l 1)(B) Rule 21, governing public and private records.

with

Rule

~~/
let{ M.1r0°g~~
Att01ney for Appellant
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URCP 56
(a) Motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. A party may move
for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim
or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary
judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion. The
motion and memoranda must follow Rule 7 as supplemented below.
(a)(l) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary
judgment must contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be genuinely
disputed. Each fact must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and supported
by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)( 1) of this rule.
(a)(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing the
motion must_ include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that
is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing to
materials in the record under paragraph ( c)( 1) of this rule. The memorandum may
contain a separate statement of additional materials facts in dispute, which must be
separately stated in numbered paragraphs and similarly supported.
(a)(3) The motion and the memorandum opposing the motion may contain a concise
statement of facts, whether disputed or undisputed, for the limited purpose of
providing background and context for the case, dispute and motion.
(a)(4) Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum opposing the
motion under paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)(2) that is not disputed is deemed admitted for
the _Qurposes of the motion. .
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment at
any time after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party or
after 21 days from the commencement of the action. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may
move for summary judgment at any time. Unless the court orders otherwise, a party
may file a motion for summary judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the
close of all discovery.
(c) Procedures.
(c)(l) Supporting factual positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely
disputed or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(c)(l)(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials; or
(c)(l)(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of
a genuine dispute.
(c)(2) Objection that a fact is not supported by admissible evidence. A party may
object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.
(c)(3) Materials not cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it
may consider other materials in the record.
(c)(4) Affidavits or declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or
oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, must set out facts that would
be admissible in evidence, and must show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.
(d) When facts are unavailable to the nonmoving party. If a nonmoving party shows
by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential
to justify its opposition, the court may:
(d)( 1) defer considering the motion or deny it without prejudice;
(d)(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or
(d)(3) issue any other appropriate order.
(e) Failing to properly support or address a fact. If a party fails to properly support an
assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as
required by paragraph (c), the court may:
(e)( 1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(e)(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(e)(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including
the facts considered undisputed-show that the moving party is entitled to it; or
(e)(4) issue any other appropriate order.
4
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(f) Judgment independent of the motion. After giving notice and a reasonable time to
respond, the court may:
(f)(l) grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party;
(f)(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or
(f)(3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material
facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.
(g) Failing to grant all the requested relief. If the court does not grant all the relief
requested by the motion, it may enter an order stating any material fact-including
an item of damages or other relief-that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the
fact as established in the case.
(h) Affidavit or declaration submitted in bad faith. If satisfied that an affidavit or
declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the courtafter notice and a reasonable time to respond-may order the submitting party to pay
the other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, it incurred as a
result. The court may also hold an offending party or attorney in contempt or order
other appropriate sanc!ions.

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
( 1)

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue

all writs and process necessary:
(a)

to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or

(b)

in aid of its jurisdiction.

(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of

interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)
(i)

a final order or decree resulting from:

(A)

a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or

(B)

a special adjudicative proceeding, as described in Section 19-1-301.5; or

(ii)

an appeal from the district court review of an informal adjudicative proceeding of

an agency other than the following:
(A)

the Public Service Commission;

(B)

the State Tax Commission;

(C)

the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;

(D)

the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action reviewed by the

executive director of the Department of Natural Resources;
(E)

the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or

(F)

the state engineer;

6
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(b)

appeals from the district court review of:

(i)

adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other

local agencies; and
(ii)

a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;

(c)

appeals from the juvenile courts;

(d)

interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those

involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e)

appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a

conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f)

appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are

incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g)

appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the

decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h)

appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not

limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i)

appeals from the Utah Military Court; and

G)

cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

7
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(3)

The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of

the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4)

The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,

Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

8
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Mark L. Anderson, No. 0105
Brandon L. Kidman, No. 12573
ANDERSON II KIDMAN

977 S. Orem Blvd.
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone:
(801) 669-6519
Facsimile:
(801) 224-8909
Email:
mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Email: brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES PRIEUR, DAN PRIEUR, MARY HERSCH, AND
JOHN PRIEUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEIRS OF
SHARON HOREN, DECEASED,

THIRD STIPULATED STATEMENT TO
EXTEND FACT DISCOVERY

PLAINTIFFS,

Civil No.: 130400555

V.
Judge Fred D. Howard

THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC.; THE ENSIGN
GROUP, INC. DBA OREM REHABil.,ITATION &
NURSING CENIBR; THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC
DBA OREM REHABil.,ITATION & SKILLED
NURSING; HUENEME HEAL1HCARE, INC.;
HUENEME HEAL1HCARE, INC, DBA OREM
REHABILITATION & NURSING CENTER;
HUENEME HEAL1HCARE, INC, DBA OREM
REHABILITATION & SKILLED NURSING; DAVID
WORKMAN, M.D.; DAVID WORKMAN, M.D., P.C.;
SCRYVER MEDICAL SALES & MARKETING,
INC.
DEFENDANTS.
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Plaintiffs and Defendants (the "Parties"), by and through their respective counsel, jointly
represent that additional time is needed to conduct fact discovery in this case. This discovery is
consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the case.
Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to an extension of the deadline for fact discovery
to June 30, 2015. For deadlines that follow after completion of fact discovery, the parties will
abide by the deadlines as outlined in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 26 th day of March, 2015.

ANDERSON KIDMAN

BRANDON L. KIDMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DATED this 26 th day ofMarch, 2015.

WILLIAMS & HUNT

STEPHEN T. HESTER
Signed with permission
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE-OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached THIRD STIPULATED
STATEMENT TO EXTEND FACT DISCOVERY in Case No. 130400555 before the Fourth
Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, was served upon the parties listed below
either via electronic notification or U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, on the 26rn day of
March, 2015.

Counsel for Defendants
Stephen Hester
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, Ste 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

/s/ Leticia Peralta
Employee of Anderson // Kidman
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Mark L. Anderson, No. 0105
Brandon L. Kidman, No. 12573
ANDERSON //KIDMAN

977 S. Orem Blvd.
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone:
(801) 669-6519
Facsimile:
(801) 224-8909
Email:
mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Email:
brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES PRIEUR, DAN PRIEUR, MARY HERSCH, AND
JOHN PRIEUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEIRS OF
SHARON HOREN, DECEASED,

STIPULATED WRITTEN STATEMENT
SHOWING GOOD CAUSE

PLAINTIFFS,

Civil No.: 130400555

V.

THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC.; THE ENSIGN

Judge Fred D. Howard

GROUP, INC. DBA OREM REHABILITATION &
NURSING CENTER; THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC
DBA OREM REHABILITATION & SKILLED ·
NURSING; HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC.;
HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC, DBA OREM
REHABILITATION & NURSING CENTER;
HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC, DBA OREM
REHABILITATION & SKILLED NURSING;
DAVID WORKMAN, M.D.; DAVID WORKMAN,
M.D., P.C.; SCRYVER MEDICAL SALES &
MARKETING, INC.
DEFENDANTS.

1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COMES NOW, the Parties, by and through counsel, hereby submit the following stipulated
written statement showing good cause why this action should not be dismissed.
1. This action was commenced in April, 2013.
2. An Amended Complaint was filed in June of 2013.
3. An Answer was filed on behalf of Defendants in August of 2013.
4. In October, 2013, Plaintiffs propounded written discovery upon Defendants.
5. Defendants needed additional time to respond to certain discovery requests, so after counsel
for the parties conferred, an extension of time was granted for Defendants to answer.
6. Defendants served their responses in December, 2013, and late January of 2014.
7. Defendants propounded written discovery upon Plaintiffs in February, 2014.
8. Plaintiffs needed additional time to respond to certain discovery requests, so after counsel for
the parties conferred, an extension of time was granted for Plaintiffs to answer.
9. Plaintiffs served their responses to Defendants' discovery requests in June, 2014.
10. Defendants wished to depose Dr. Terry Hammond, which deposition took place on May 19,
2014.
11. Defendants also expressed the desire to take the deposition of one of Ms. Sharon Horen's
heirs.
12. Counsel for the parties conferred with one another regarding this deposition and which heir the
Defendants wished to depose.
13. In November of 2014, Defendants let Plaintiffs know that they would like to take the
deposition of James Prieur.
14. Defendants have deposed James.Prieur.
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15. Defendants are prepared to stipulate to a breach of the duty of care.
16. Defendants' counsel has been preparing said stipulation for Plaintiffs' review, but has not been
able to finish the stipulation.
17. Defendants' counsel is hopeful that the stipulation will be done in the next couple of weeks.
18. Counsel for the parties have amicably stipulated to extensions of fact discovery deadlines in
order to accommodate these actions.
19. That once the stipulation is finalized, the parties are prepared to move this case forward into
the next phase of discovery.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2016.

ANDERSON KIDMAN

BRANDON L. KIDMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DATED this 5th day of January, 2016.

COHNE KINGHORN

STEPHEN T. HESTER
Signed with permission
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached WRITTEN STATEMENT
SHOWING GOOD CAUSE in Case No. 130400555 before the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah
County, State of Utah, was served upon the parties listed below via electronic notification.
Counsel for Defendants
Stephen Hester
CORNE KINGHORN

111 East Broadway, 11 th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Isl Brandon Kidman
Employee of Anderson// Kidman
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Allen M. Young (16203)

BIGHORN LAW
331 South Rio Grande Street, Ste. 207
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Tel: (801) 669-6519
Fax: (801) 224-8909
allen@bighornlaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES PRIEUR, DAN PRIEUR, MARY
HERSCH, AND JOHN PRIEUR, INDIVIDUAL
and as heirs of SHARON HOREN, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

v.
THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC.; THE ENSIGN
GROUP, INC. DBA OREM
REHABILITATION &NURSING CENTER;
THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC. DBA OREM
REHABILITATION & SKILLED NURSING;
HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC.;
HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC, DBA
OREM REHABILITATION & NURSING
CENTER; HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC,
DBA OREM REHABILITATION & SKILLED
NURSING; DAVID WORKMAN, M.D.;
DAVID WORKMAN, M.D., P.C.; SCRYVER
MEDICAL SALES & MARKETING, INC.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE
COURT'S lVIlNUTE ORDER AS TO
THE PARTIES' JANUARY 24, 2017
STIPULATION

Civil No.: 130400555
Judge James Brady

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through counsel and pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, submit the following Motion for Relief from the Court's Minute Order as to the
Parties' January 24, 2017 Stipulation.
16
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RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiffs are requesting relief from the Court's Minute Order of January 30, 2017 declining to
ratify the parties' January 24, 2017 stipulation to extend discovery in this matter. Rule 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provide Plaintiffs with a legal avenue to request that the Court reverse its
ruling on these Orders. See U.R.C.P. 60(b).
As set forth more fully below, pursuant to Rule 60(b), the Court is empowered to reverse its
ruling, and in fact, it should reverse its prior decision in this matter, because its refusal to ratify the
parties' stipulation was not based upon a need for judicial determination. This refusal cut off the
agreed upon avenue to conducting discovery in this case. As such, Plaintiffs respectfully request
that the Court GRANT Plaintiffs' Motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and allow the parties to proceed with discovery, pursuant to their agreement.

STATEMENT QF FACTS
1.

On March 26, 2015, the parties stipulated to extend discovery. See Third Stipulated

Statement to Extend Fact Discovery, Ct. Docket.
2.

In that Stipulation, the parties anticipated concluding fact discovery on June 30, 2015.

3.

The parties were unable to complete fact discovery within the anticipated June 30,

See id.

2015 deadline, including Defendants' request to conduct Plaintiff James Prieur's deposition on
September 25, 2015. See Amended Notice ofTaking Deposition of James Prieur, filed August 25,
2015, Ct. Docket.
4.

The parties continued attempting to resolve this matter without incurring additional

costs and using Court resources. See Brandon Kidman Declaration, i1 8, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

Shortly after Mr. Prieur's September 25, 2015 deposition, Defendants agreed that they

breached the standard of care, and agreed to prepare a Stipulation to that effect. See Stipulated Written

17
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Statement Showing Good Cause, dated January 5, 2016, Ct. Docket; Kidman Deel., ,r 9, Ex. A.
6.

As of January 2016, Plaintiffs were still waiting for Defendants to provide a draft of

the stipulation admitting breach of the standard of care. See id; Kidman Deel., ,r 10, Ex. A.
· 7.

Defendants expressed interest in attempting to mediate this case prior to incurring

expert discovery costs. See Kidman Deel., ,r 11, Ex. A.
8.

The parties scheduled a mediation to take place on July 11, 2016, which was postponed

at the request of defense counsel for persoi:ial reasons. See Kidman Deel., ,r 13-14, Ex. A.
9.

The parties were able to reschedule the mediation to take place on August 25, 2016,

with Lew Quigley as the mediator. See Kidman Deel., ,r 15-16, Ex. A.
10.

The parties were unable to reach an agreement on the date of the mediation, and Mr.

Quigley continued communicating with both parties in an attempt to resolve the matter without further
litigation. See Kidman Deel., ,r 16, Ex. A.
11.

Toward the end of 2016, Mr. Quigley informed Plaintiffs' previous counsel, Brandon

Kidman, that settlement on this case would be unlikely. See Kidman Deel., ,r 17, Ex. A.
12.

Mr. Kidman then reached out to Defendants' counsel in order to come up with a new

discovery plan now that a resolution to the case without proceeding with litigation was unlikely. See
Kidman Deel., ,r 18, Ex. A; Kidman December 29, 2016 email, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
13.

After Mr. Kidman did not hear any response from Defendants' counsel, and the Court

issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, he sent a follow-up email to Defendants' counsel. See Kidman
Deel.,

,r 19, Ex. A; Kidman January 12, 2017 email, Ex. B.
14.

Defendants' counsel responded, apologizing for not responding to the December 29,

2016 email, and agreed to entering into a new stipulation governing expert discovery, specifically
stating, "we need to make sure it indicates that the fact discovery deadline has passed and that we are
now moving into expert discovery." See Kidman Deel.,

18

,r 20, Ex. A; Stephen Hester January 12, 2017
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email, Ex. B.
15.

The parties were able to finalize a new Stipulation and submitted a proposed case

management order to the Court that would assist in allowing the case to move forward. See Kidman
Deel.,

,r 21, Ex. A.
16.

Both parties agreed to postpone expert discovery and the expensive costs associated

with expert discovery in an effort to use resources to resolve this case with further unnecessary costs.
See Kidman Deel., 1 11, Ex. A.

17.

Both parties anticipated that expert discovery would not begin until early 2017. See

Kidman Deel., 1 11 & 20-21, Ex. A; Hester January 12, 2017 email, Ex. B; Stipulation and Proposed
Order filed January 24, 2017, Ct. Docket.
18.

The parties anticipated that Plaintiffs would disclose their experts on February 28,

2017. See Kidman Deel., ,r 21, Ex. A; Stipulation and Proposed Order filed January 24, 2017, Ct.
Docket.
19.

On January 30, 2017, the Court declined to sign the proposed order, entering a note

that discovery had closed. See Ct Docket.

ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 60, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their Motion for relief from the
Court's January 30, 2017 Minute Order, for the reasons set forth below.
L

PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b), THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE ITS PRIOR
MlNUTE ORDER AS TO THE PARTIES STIPULATION ON DISCOVERY

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:

19

(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(b)(l) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(b )(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(b)(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an opposing party;
4
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(b)(4) the judgment is void;
(b)(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or
(b)(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant relief from its prior Order as to the fully executed
agreement between the parties to extend discovery entered into on January 24, 2017. The Utah Supreme Court
has noted that courts are typically bound by a parties' stipulation, unless that stipulation requires a judicial
determination. The parties' agreement to extend the time for discovery in this matter can be and should be
ratified by the Court. As such, a reconsideration of the Court's January 30, 2017 minute order is warranted.
A.

The Parties' Stipulation was not Repudiated by Either Party, as such, it Should
have Been Upheld by the Court

In this case, the District Court failed to allow Plaintiffs to submit their expert disclosures
within the timeframe agreed upon by the parties. The parties initially entered into a Stipulation
and the Court signed a Case Management Order extending fact discovery through June 30, 2015.

See Third Stipulated Statement to Extend Fact Discovery, Ct. Docket. However, due to scheduling
conflicts and Defendants' request to continue fact discovery efforts, the parties were unable to
complete discovery within the June 30, 2015 deadline.
Not only had the parties been pursuing settlement opportunities, litigation was actively being
prepared for as well. Defendants scheduled a deposition of Defendants on September 25, 2015. See
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of James Prieur, filed August 25, 2016, Ct. Docket. Likewise,
Plaintiffs scheduled deposition of Defendants' 30(b)(6) designee for September 30, 2016. See Notice
of Deposition of the Defendants Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(B)(6), filed August 25,
2016, Ct. Docket.
Following these depositions, the parties agreed to narrow the triable issues in this case by
entering into a stipulation in which Defendants agreed to admit breaching the standard of care. See
Stipulated Written Statement Showing Good Cause, dated January 5, 2016, Ct. Docket. In the process
20
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of preparing that Stipulation, defense counsel indicated to Plaintiffs that they were not ready to
proceed into expert discovery, and that they desired to attempt mediation before incurring expert
discovery costs. See Kidman Deel., ,r 11, Ex. A. The mediation ultimately failed and mediation efforts
ended in December 2016. See Kidman Affidavit, ,r 17-18; Kidman December 29, 2016 email, Ex. B.
Following the parties' failure to resolve this case through the mediator, Plaintiffs' previous
counsel, Brandon Kidman, attempted to contact defense counsel in order to move forward with expert
discovery. See Kidman Affidavit, ,r 17-18; Kidman December 29, 2016 email, Ex. B. Mr. Kidman
sent a follow-up email to defense counsel on January 12, 2017, again attempting to set a timeline for
expert discovery now that mediation failed. See Kidman Affidavit, ,r 19; Kidman Jan. 12, 2017 email,
Ex. B. Defense counsel responded on that day, and agreed to review Plaintiffs' proposal for
completing expert discovery. See Kidman Deel., ,r 20, Ex. A; Hester January 12, 2017 email, Ex. B. In
that email, defense counsel expressly stated that in the stipulation "we need to make sure it indicates
that the fact discovery deadline has passed and that we are now moving into expert discovery." See id
On January 24, 2017, the parties agreed that February 28, 2017 would be a reasonable deadline for the
parties' burden of proof expert disclosures. See Kidman Deel., ,r 21, Ex. A Stipulation and Proposed
Order filed January 24, 2017, Ct. Docket.
Before the February 28, 2017 deadline, and despite the good faith efforts by the parties to
resolve the case in the most amicable and cost-effective way, the Court declined the parties' stipulated
request to move into expert discovery. On January 30, 2017, the Court declined to sign the Stipulated
proposed Order, with a minute entry that stated, "the discovery period has closed. The parties do not
show good cause for the delays in this case. This case should either be dismissed, or proceed to trial
without further delay." See minute entry, Ct. Docket. Then on February 21, 2017, the Court entered a
Notice of Final Pretrial Conference, reiterating its denial of the parties' stipulated request. See Ct.
Docket.
21
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This refusal to honor the stipulated-to agreement between the parties runs contrary to the
Utah Supreme Court's holding that, unless there are issues for judicial determination in the
stipulation, "ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations between parties." First of Denver Mortg.
lnv'rs v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). 1
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has noted that '[t]here is an institutional hesitancy to
relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel,' Birch v.
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a
Court may only set aside a stipulation in certain circumstances-none of which are present in the
instant case. The stipulation in this case was agreed upon by parties' counsel, and was not
"inadvertent." But most importantly, there was no request by either party to rescind the stipulation.
[A] court has the discretion to set aside a stipulation under certain conditions. First, the
party seeking relief from the stipulation must request it by motion from the trial court.
Second, the motion to repudiate the stipulation must be timely filed. Third, it must show that
the stipulation was "entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." Inadvertence
cannot be the basis for repudiation when the mistake was " 'due to failure to exercise due
diligence, [or if it could] have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.' We have also
noted that "[i]t is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the court was
entered into inadvertently." Fourth, the lower court must state its basis for relieving the
parties of the stipulation. ("In the absence of any articulated 'justifiable cause,' we must
reverse the withdrawal of the stipulation."
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. ofUtah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, ,I 21, 20 P.3d 287,
293 (Internal Citations Omitted) (Emphasis Added).

Neither party asked for the stipulation to be repudiated. There was certainly no motion filed
to repudiate the stipulation. And finally, the stipulation was entered into with the assistance of
counsel. Likewise, the parties' stipulation in this matter was not dependent upon a judicial
determination in any form. The parties had been diligent in pursuing settlement in this matter and
had communicated with each other on the need for discovery-including to commence expert

1

The term 'Judicial determination" is a nebulous one. Although Plaintiffs were unable to find a more definite description of what items are
ripe for judicial determination, a case involving a stipulation in a contract case noting time extensions noted that judicial determination is
unnecessary as "Such an exception is not applicable in this case." Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2009 UT App 314,221 P.3d 884, 886, Fn. 1.
22
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discovery. Furthermore, there was no contention between the parties that discovery had been
completed. The Court's decision to terminate discovery in the matter was unwarranted as the parties
were of one accord as to the need for further discovery.
Based upon this unanimity of purpose of the parties and the lack of any need for judicial
determination by the Court, it should have allowed the parties' stipulated-to agreement to stand. As
such, based upon this understandable, but mistaken decision by the Court, striking of its January 30,
2017 order is appropriate.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their Rule
60 Motion and strike its prior January 30, 2017 Minute Order as to the Parties' Stipulation.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2018.

BIGHORN LAW
Isl Allen M Young
Allen M. Young
331 South Rio Grande Street, Ste. 207
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Tel: (801) 669-6519
Fax: (80 I) 224-8909
allen@bighomlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of July, 2018, Plaintiffs served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM IBE COURT'S MINUTE ORDER AS TO THE
PARTIES' JANUARY 24, 2017 STIPULATION upon the parties listed below via electronic

notification.
Stephen T. Hester
Kimberley L. Hansen
CORNE KINGHORN
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 801-363-4300
shester@cohnekinghorn.com
khansen@cohnekinghorn.com
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EXHIBIT A
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David E. Brown, # 13155
BIGHORN LAW
331 S. Rio Grande St., Ste 207
Telephone: (801) 669-6519
Facsimile:
(801) 224-8909
Email:
david@bighornlaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAJvfES PRIEUR, DAN PRIEUR, MARY
HERSCH, AND JOHN PRIEUR,
INDIVIDUALLY and as heirs of SHARON
HOREN, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

DECLARATION OF
BRANDON KIDMAN

V.

THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC.; THE ENSIGN
GROUP, INC. DBA OREM
REHABILITATION &NURSING CENTER;
THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC. DBA OREM
REHABILITATION & SKILLED NURSING;
HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC.;
HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC, DBA
OREM REHABILITATION &NURSING
CENTER; HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC,
DBA OREM REHABILITATION & SKILLED
NURSING; DAVID WORKMAN, M.D.;
DAVID WORI<MAN, M.D., P.C.; SCRYVER
MEDICAL SALES & MARKETING, INC.

Civil No.: 130400555
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

I, Brandon Kidman, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is
true and correct.
26
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1.

I am over the age of 18 years old and I have personal knowledge of the information

contained herein.
2.

I am former counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-captioned lawsuit.

3.

While litigati~g this case, I had worked together with Defendants' counsel, cooperating

with the defense during discovery in an effort to bring this case to an amicable solution.
4.

In working with defense counsel, the parties, on occasion, needed additional time as

they worked together to attempt to resolve this case.
5.

On March 26, 2015, the parties anticipated being able to complete fact discovery by

June 30, 2015, and filed a Stipulation and pl'Oposed Order granting the extension for discovery, which
the Court eventually signed.
6.

Dw-ing that time, Defendants wished to depose one of the plaintiffs, James Prieur.

7.

Defendants were unable to depose Mr. Prieur by June 30, 2015, so the parties

continued fact discovery beyond that timeframe, and Defendants deposed Mr. Prieur on September
25, 2015.

8.

Following that deposition, the parties continued attempting to resolve this matter

without incurring additional costs and using Court resources.
9.

Shortly after Mr. Prieur's September 25, 2015 deposition, Defendants agreed that they

breached the standard of care, and agreed to prepare a Stipulation to that effect.
10.

As of January 2016, Plaintiffs were still waiting for Defendants to provide a draft of

the stipulation admitting breach of the standard of care.
11.

Defendants' counsel indicated that they were not r~ady to proceed into expert

. discovery and that desired to mediate this matter before moving forward with expert discovery, and
incurring those costs.
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12.

That due to these conversations and assurances, counsel for the Plaintiffs did not move

forward with expert discovery issues before the two parties attempted to mediate this matter.
13. ·

The parties worked together and scheduled a mediation for July 11, 2016.

14.

That due to the wedding of one of Defendants' counsel, Defendants cancelled the July

11, 2016 mediation session.
15.

The pal'ties continued to work towards establishing a date for the mediation, which was

eventually scheduled and held on August 25, 2016.
16.

Once the initial mediation session proved unsuccessful, Lew Quigley, who conducted

the mediation, reached out to counsel for Defendants on numerous occasions to see if a mediated
settlement could be reached.
17.

Late in 2016, Mr. Quigley informed me that Defendants' position had not changed and

that a mediated settlement in this matter was unlikely.

18.

Upon hearing said information, I reached out to counsel for Defendants in order to get

discovery deadlines established and to sta1t moving the case fo1ward.
19.

I again reached out to Defendants' counsel on January 12, 2017, having not received a

response to the prior email, upon which I received a response from Defendants' counsel.
20.

Defendants' counsel responded, apologizing for not responding to the December 29,

2016 email, and agreed to entering into a new stipulation governing expe1t discovery, specifically
stating, "we need to make sure it indicates that the fact discovery deadline has passed and that we are
now moving into expert discovery."

21.

In January of 2017, defense counsel and I agreed to the following regarding fact and

. expert discovery:
Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate that no ftuther fact discovery is
needed and that fact discovery is now closed. The patties stipulate that Plaintiff's
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Rule 26(A)(4)(C)(i) disclosures will be due on February 28, 2017, and that for all
other deadlines that follow, the paities will abide by the deadlines as outlined in
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Stipulation and Case Management Order, filed the 24th of January, 2017.
22.

Given the good working relationship pefendants' counsel and 1 had, I felt the

stipulation establishing the deadline for expert discovery and disclosures for February 28, 2017, would
move this case forward towards a resolution.

Executed on this 27th day of April, 2018.

Isl Brandon Kidman
Brandon Kidman
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4/13/2017

Anderson Kidman Law Mall - Horen v. Orem Rehab

Brandon Kidman <brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com>

Horen v. Orem Rehab
15 messages
Brandon Kidman <brandon@andersonkldmanlaw.com>
To: Stephen Hester <shester@cohnekinghom.com>

Thu, Dec 29, 2016at 1:16 PM

Hi Steve,

I hope that your holidays have been enjoyable.
It appears that we need to start moving this matter forward. Lew Indicated that he contacted your office and there was
no change in your client's position from the mediation. I think we just need to get some discovery deadlines established
and start moving forward.
Thanks,
Brandon
Brandon Kidman, Esq.
Bighorn Law
977 South Orem Blvd.
Orem, UT 84058
T: 801.669.6519
F: 801.224.8909
Brandon Kidman <brandon@andersonkldmanlaw.com>
To: Stephen Hester <shester@cohneklnghom.com>
Cc: Nikki Bowen <nbowen@cohnekinghom.com>

Thu, Jan 121 2017

at 7:48 AM

HI Steve,

Hope that all is going well. I have not heard back from you regarding the email sent below. Additionally, I received the
Notice of Intent to Dismiss from the Court. I prepared the attached Stipulation Showing Good Cause for your review.
Will you please review It and let me know if I have your permission to sign and file it on your behalf.
Thanks,
Brandon
[Quoted text hfdden]

~

1.11.17 Written Statement Showing Good Cause.docx

34K
Stephen Hester <shester@cohnekinghom.com>
To: Brandon Kidman <brandon@andersonkldmanlaw.com:;Cc: Nikki Bowen <nbowen@cohnekinghorn.com>

Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 5:41 PM

Hi Brandon - sorry I didn't respond to your earlier email; not sure how I missed it. I'll take a look at the stip and get
back to you. I haven't looked at it yet, but we need to make sure it indicates that the fact discovery deadline has
passed and that we are now moving into expert discovery. I'll be in touch. Thanks.

Steve
31
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Mark L. Anderson, No. 0105
Brandon L. Kidman, No. 12573
ANDERSON II KIDMAN

977 S. Orem Blvd.
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone:
(801) 669-6519
Facsimile:
(801) 224-8909
Email:
mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Email: brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH DIST
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNT

JAMESPRIEUR, DANPRIEUR, MARY HERSG}::;'' ;:-:, JOHN pr .EUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEIRS
OF SHARONHOREN, DECEASED,
PLAINTIFFS,
V.
THE ENSIGN GROUP, IN( , THE EN: .GN GROUP, INC. DBA OREM REHABILITATION &NURSING
CENTER; THE ENSV:T GR'- . JP, Il\V..JBA OREM REHABILITATION & SKILLED
NURSING;HUE1'J .,1v.lE H • T,TBt:."ARE, INC.; HUENEME HEALTH CARE, INC, DBA OREM
REHABILITATIO
"" • .I} ·_iUlli:;,_ ;,3 CENTER; HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC, DBA OREM
REHABll/ A'L ~N &. ~KILLED NURSING; DAYID WORKMAN, M.D.; DAVID WORKMAN, M.D., P.C.;
SCRYVL ' MEr .CAL SALES & MARKETING, INC.
D.J ENDANTS.

STIPULATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER

Civil No.: 130400555

Judge Fred D. Howard
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Plaintiffs and Defendants (the "Parties"), by and through their respective counsel,
jointly submit the following Stipulation and Case Management Order. This Stipulation
and Order is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of the case.
Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate that no further fu,9t discovery is needed
and that fact discovery is now closed. The parties stipulate'that Plaintiff's Rule 26(A)(4)
(C)(i) disclosures will be due on February 28, 2017, and that for all other deadlines that
follow, the parties will abide by the deadlines as outlineo in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DATED this 24th day ofJanuary, 2017.
ANDERSON KIDMAN

Isl Brandon Kidman

BRANDO:ff~ . KIDMAN
Attorneys for Defendants

DATED this 24th day of January, 2017.
Cohne Kinghorn

Isl Stephen Hester

STEPHEN T. HESTER
Signed with permission
Attorneys for Defendants
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SO ORDERED as of the date and per the official seal at the top of page 1.
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Mark L. Anderson, No. 0 105
Brandon L. Kidman, No. 12573
ANDERSON// KIDMAN

977 S. Orem Blvd.
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone:
(801) 669-6519
Facsimile:
(801) 224-8909
Email:
mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Email: brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH I
IN AND FOR UTAH fl ·

JAMESPRIEUR, DANPRIEUR, MARY

TAH

··

JOHN PRIEUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND

STIPULATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT ORDER

·

Civil No.: 130400555

Judge Fred D. Howard
ENSI@1SI:t8ROUP, INC.; T I-IE ENSIGN GROUP,
INC. • A OREM REHABILITATION &NURSING
CENTER;

D-JE ENSIGN GROUP, INCDBA OREM

REHABILITATION & SKILLED NURSING;HUENEME
HEALTHCARE, INC.; HUENEME HEALTHCARE,
INC, DBA OREM REHABILITATION & NURSING
CENTER; HUENEME HEALTHCARE, INC, DBA
OREM REHABILITATION & SKILLED N URSING;
DAVID WORKMAN, M.D.; DAVID WORKMAN, M.D.,
P.C.; SCRYVER MEDICAL SALES & MARKETING,
INC.
DEFENDANTS.
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Plaintiffs and Defendants (the "Parties"), by and through their respective counsel, jointly
submit the following Stipulation and Case Management Order. This Stipulation and Order is

determination of the case.
Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate that n

«·

discovery is now closed. The parties stipulate :ili'at'"P1a·

i~

s needed and that fact

(A)(4)(C)(i) disclosures will be

ANDERSON KIDMAN

Isl Brandon Kidman

BRANDON L. KIDMAN
Attorneys for Defendants

FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF C LAIM AND N OTICE OF INTENT TO C OMMENCE LEGAL ACTION
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DATED this 24th day oDanuary, 2017.

Cohne Kinghorn

s

--c.;,

.

SO ORDERED as of the

r

e

n
or De endants

e official seal at the top of page 1.

FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF CLAIM AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE L EGAL ACTION

Page 3 of3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

JAMES PRIEUR, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

/

l

'-I{ 12L17 ~

RULING RE: DEFENDANTS'MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 130400555

THE ENSIGN GROUP, et al.,

Judge James Brady

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants request the Court grant summary judgment in their favor because of Plaintiffs' failure
to offer competent expert testimony to establish the proximate cause element of their medical
negligence claim. Neither party requested oral argument and the issues have been authoritatively
decided. See U.R.C.P. 7(h). Based on the Court's review of the documents on file and the motion
associated memoranda, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
This medical malpractice case arose out of the care and treatment received by Plaintiffs'
decedent, Sharon Horen ("Ms. Horen"), at Central Utah Clinic and Defendant Orem
Rehabilitation and Skilled Nursing ("Orem Rehab"). On October 15, 2010, Ms. Horen was seen
by John Walker, a nephrology APRN, at Central Utah Clinic for examination following an
observed change in Ms. Horen's condition at Orem Rehab. During this visit, Mr. Walker wrote an
order for STAT labs to be performed on Ms. Horen and Ms. Horen was returned to Orem Rehab
with the order. Ms. Horen's blood was drawn and the STAT lab results were faxed to Orem
Rehab at approximately 7:14 p.m. on that same day. The STAT lab results indicated that Ms.
Horen had a serum potassium level of 8.6-a "high panic" value.
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Deputy

The staff at Orem Rehab failed to notice, report, or otherwise act on the STAT labs. Mr.
Walker likewise failed to follow up on his order. As a result, none of Ms. Horen 's health care
providers were made aware of her serum potassium level of 8.6. Just after midnight on October
16, 2010, Ms. Horen was found minimally responsive by Orem Rehab staff. Following transport
to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, and pursuant to Ms. Horen 's advanced directive, no
therapeutic treatments were administered and Ms. Horen expired on October 16, 2010.
Plaintiffs' initial complaint was filed on April 13, 2013. During this four year time period
the parties executed arguably four stipulations to extend discovery, yet Plaintiffs consistently
failed to conduct discovery of any kind or designate any experts. After the Court issued its third
Notice of Intent to Dismiss on January 4, 2017, the parties executed a second Stipulated Written
Statement Showing Good Cause. The Court found there was no showing of good cause and that
the discovery period had closed. The Court indicated that the case should either be dismissed or
proceed to trial without further delay. Upon receiving no response from the parties, the Court set
the case for a final pre-trial conference on April 17, 2017, requiring the parties to file any pretrial motions by March 10, 2017. Defendants then filed this Motion for Summary Judgment.
RULING
Summary judgment is proper "if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." U.R. C.P.
56(a). The Court initially notes that because Plaintiffs failed to dispute any of Defendants'
alleged facts in their opposition memorandum, all of Defendants' statements of material fact are
deemed admitted under U.R.C.P. 56(a)(4) which states, "each material fact set forth in the
motion ... that is not disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion."
I.
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A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case "must provide expert testimony establishing that
the health care provider's negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injury." Kent v. Pioneer

Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Expert testimony in medical malpractice
cases is crucial because the "causal link between the negligence and the injury [is] usually not
within the common knowledge of the law juror" and expert testimony ensures "fact finders have
adequate knowledge upon which to base their decisions.'' Morgan v. Intermountain Health Care,

Inc., 2011 UT App 253, ,r 9, 263 P.3d 405. A limited "common knowledge" exception to this
general rule applies "when the causal link between the negligence and the injury would be clear
to a lay juror who has no medical training ...." Id. ,r 10 (citations omitted).
During the four years that this case has been pending, Plaintiffs have failed to offer any
competent expert testimony or even designate any expert witnesses despite being given ample
opportunity to do so, and Plaintiffs are now precluded from offering any expert testimony. Given
the Plaintiffs' decedent's underlying conditions and the timing and course of treatment by nonparty health care providers, this case involves complex issues of causation and allocation of fault

and the common knowledge exception does not apply. Because the common knowledge
exception is inapplicable, and because Plaintiffs have not and cannot offer any competent expert
testimony to establish the proximate cause element of their prima facie case at trial, Defendants
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs argue that their failure to disclose expert witnesses is harmless and that they
have good cause for their failure, citing to U.R.C.P. 26(d)(4): "[i]f a party fails to disclose or to
supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed
witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure." However, Plaintiffs merely assert that their failure to disclose
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expert witnesses is hannless and that they have good cause for their failure without supporting
their assertion with argument, facts, or explanation of any kind.
Utah courts have consistently held that expert testimony must be timely disclosed and
that failure to do so is prejudicial to an opposing party. See Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App
303,118, 141 P.3d 629; Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 2014 UT App 180, ,r 17,332 P.3d
969. Because the Court finds Plaintiffs' failure to disclose expert witnesses is not harmless and
that there is no showing of good cause, Defendants are entitled to judgment as matter of law.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment. Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

DATED this L . a y of April, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the 1~ day of April,
2017 by email to the following:

Mark L. Anderson
Brandon L. Kidman
ANDERSON// KIDMAN

977 S. Orem Blvd.
Orem, UT 84058
mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com
Stephen T. Hester
Kimberly L. Hansen
COHNE KINGHORN

111 East Broadway, 11 th Floor

Salt Lake City, UT 84111
shester@cohnekinghom.com
khansen@cohnekinghom.com

Deputy Court Clerk

.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

4/12/i1

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
l,£T' Deputy
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT----+.------JAMES PRIEUR, et al.,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR IN LIMINE RE: PLAINTIFFS EXPERT
Plaintiffs.
TESTIMONY

vs.
THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC., et al.,

Case No. 130400555

Defendants.

Judge James Brady

This case is before the Court on Defendants' motion to preclude Plaintiffs from
presenting expert testimony at trial. This motion is based on Plaintiffs' failure to provide initial
disclosures of expert witnesses, to supplement their disclosures and their failure to identify any
expert witnesses during discovery. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion claiming that there is no
need to disclose expert witnesses because Defendants have admitted their breach of duty owed,
and because their failure to disclose expert witnesses is justified. Plaintiffs' arguments are not
persuasive. Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs' misunderstand the import of Defendants' stipulation that they breached the
standard of care regarding the care given to Ms. Sharon Horen. Plaintiffs claim because of this
stipulation "[i]t is established that Defendants are liable for the death of Ms. Horen." This is
incorrect. Plaintiffs stipulation is limited to duty and breach of that duty. It does not establish
causation and therefor liability. Assuming Plaintiffs intend to present expert testimony at trial
regarding issues of causation or damages, they had an obligation to disclose their expert
witnesses and provide the information required by Rule 26 URCP.

Page-1-
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Rule 26. General provisions governing disclosure and discovery.

(a)(4) Expert testimony.
(a)(4)(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a
discovery request, serve on the other parties the following information regarding
any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly
involve giving expert testimony: (i) the expert's name and qualifications,
including a list of all publications authored within the preceding 10 years, and a
list of any other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to
which the witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other information that
will be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the
compensation to be paid for the witness's study and testimony.
Plaintiffs' failed to disclose any expert witnesses either initially, or pursuant to Rule 26
following the close of the fact discovery period. Exclusion of testimony from undisclosed expert
witnesses is addressed in Rule 26(d)(4). "If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a
disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or
material at any hearing or trial unle~s the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for
the failure."
Plaintiffs claim to have good cause for their failure to disclose expert witnesses. They
claim they were lulled into a sense of security by Defendants' representations to ''work with them
on discovery'' and because they were engaged in settlement negotiations. Plaintiffs assertions are
inadequate. The last stipulation of the parties extended fact discovery only until June 30, 2015.
Thereafter Plaintiffs' obligation to disclose expert witnesses needed to be complied with. The
court has no timely stipulation of the parties to extend discovery or disclosure of expert
witnesses.
Even if there were a "working" relationship between counsel, it is irrelevant because
Page-2-
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Plaintiffs' attorney was required to file such disclosures in writing and with the level of detail
specified by the rul~s. See Id R. 26(a)(5) (requiring that all initial, expert testimony, and pretrial
disclosures "be made in writing, signed and served"). Plaintiffs have not met this obligation.
Plaintiffs have shown no good cause for their failure to identify expert witnesses.
Defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony at trial is GRANTED.
April 11, 2017
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CERTIFT.CATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 1304C0555 by the method and on the date specified.
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL

EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

MARK L ANDERSON mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
KIMBERLEY L HANSEN khansen@cohnekinghorn.com
STEPHEN T HESTER shester@cohnekinghorn.com
BRANDON L KIDMAN brandon@andersonkidmanlaw.com

04/12/2017

/s/ MIKE TRONIER

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County! State of Utah
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPART:rvIBNT
eputy
JAMES PRIEUR, et al.,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR IN LIMINE RE: DAMAGES
Plaintiffs.

vs.
Case No. 130400555

THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC., et al.,
Judge James Brady
Defendants.

This case is before the Court on Defendants' motion to preclude Plaintiffs from
presenting evidence related to their damages claims. The motion is based on Plaintiffs' failure to
provide adequate initial disclosures of damages, to supplement their disclosures and their failure
to provide a method of calculating damages in response to Defendants' discovery requests.
Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motion claiming that there is no need to disclose damage amounts,
method of damage calculations or that their failure to disclose their calculation of damages is
harmless. Plaintiffs are required by rule and case law to provide damage calculations in their
disclosur~s and to supplement their disclosures during discovery to allow Defendants an
opportunity to conduct discovery on that issue. Plaintiffs' argument that the failure to
disclose damages is harmless is not persuasive. Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs cite to the 1963 case of Jorgensen v Gonzalez, 383 P.2d 934, 936 (1963) for
the position that " ... the calculation of damages is properly left to the sound discretion of a
jury of practical people upon the basis of the evidence and in light of their experience in the

affairs of life." Unfortunately Plaintiffs misread Jorgensen. In that case, the issue was not the

Page -1-
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requirement to disclose damage. The issue in Jorgensen was whether or not there is a limit on
the amount of damages a jury hearing the evidence may award. Jorgensen provides no solace
for a party who fails to disclose evidence of damage calculation under Rule 26.
The relevant portions of Rule 26 provide:
Rule 26. General provisions governing disclosure and discovery.
(a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule
governing disclosure and discovery in a practice area.
(a)(l) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party
shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties:
(a)(l)(A) ...
(a)(l)(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all
discoverable documents or evidentiary material on which such computation
is based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or

response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness,
document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or
the party shows good cause for the failure.

In addition to the information provided in the initial disclosures, parties are required to
supplement their initial disclosures to provide the required information when it becomes
available to them. Failure to disclose, or to adequately supplement damage calculations can and
does result in evidence being precluded at trial.
The Court of Appeals recently addressed the consequence of failing to disclose damages:
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires litigants to make initial
disclosures of certain fact witnesses, documents, and other information. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(C) (2010). And rule 26(e){l) requires a party "to supplement at
appropriate intervals [initial] disclosures if the party learns that in some material
respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional
or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing." Id R. 26(e)(l). Finally, the rule
provides that "a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other
parties ... a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing
Page -2-
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party." Id R. 26(a)(l)(C).
A plaintiff is required to prove both the fact of damages and the amount of
damages." Stevens-Henager Coll. v. Eagle Gate Coll., 2011 UT App 37, ,r 16,
248 P.3d 1025. "To establish the fact of damages, '[t]he evidence ... must give rise
to a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage.' "Id (alteration and
omission in original) (quoting Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)). "While the standard for determining the
amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving the fact of
damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages." TruGreen
Cos., LLC, v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 UT 81, ,r 15, 199 P.3d 929 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Stevens-Henager, 2011 UT App 37, ,I 22, 248
P.3d 1025; see also Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ,r 36,215 P.3d
933. If "factual contentions about the amount of damages ... require further
investigation or discovery," the party must "undertake that investigation as early
in the litigation process as is practicable." Stevens-Henager, 2011 UT App 37, ,r
24, 248 P.3d 1025. And investigation and discovery must be completed according
to the schedule set by the district court. See id,· see also Bodell, 2009 UT 52, ,r,r
36-37, 215 P.3d 933.

Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain W. Title, 2016 UT App 62, ,r,r 13 14, 370 P.3d 963, 967
Plaintiffs' initial disclosures refer to damages only in general terms claiming they may be
proven at trial. This form of disclosure is insufficient to comply with Rule 26. Plaintiffs
responded to discovery requests for damage calculations by objecting to disclosing damages for
various reasons, and reserving the right to supplement their response. (They did not supplement
their response during the discovery period.)
Plaintiffs wrongly claim their failure to disclose evidence of damages is harmless. Failure
to disclose calculations of damages precluded Defendants from conducting discovery regarding
those calculations. Plaintiffs claim Defendants' stipulation that Defendants violated the standard
of care, establishes the fact of damages. It does not. It establishes only that a duty owed was
breached, not that damages were incurred by these plaintiffs. It also does not provide any

Page -3-
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evidence of the amount of, or calculation of damages. Plaintiff has not provided the required
damages disclosures within the time allowed by the court, or at any time in these proceedings.
Plaintiffs have shown no good cause for their failure to disclose their damages to
Defendant.
Defendants' motion to exclude evidence related to Plaintiffs' damage claims is
GRANTED.
April 11, 2017
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CJ::RTIFTCATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 130400555 by the method and on the date specified.
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL

EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

MARK L ANDERSON mark@andersonkidmanlaw.com
KIMBERLEY L HANSEN khansen@cohnekinghorn.com
STEP!l:·:N T HESTER shester@cohnekinghorn.com
BRAtJDeJ L l~.IDMAN brandon@andersonkidmanlaw. com

04/12/2017

/s/

MIKE TRONIER

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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